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AGAINST SHAREHOLDER PARTICIPATION:
A TREATMENT FOR MCCONVILL’S
PSYCHONOMICOSIS
Harry G. Hutchison* & R. Sean Alley**
I. INTRODUCTION
A current debate in corporate law and governance concerns how power
should be allocated among directors, shareholders and management.
Proposals to strengthen the power of shareholders include an American Bar
Association proposal to amend the Model Business Corporation Act to
require a majority vote for the election of directors,1 a recent congressional
initiative mandating advisory shareholder votes on executive pay plans2 and
Lucian Bebchuk’s effort to vindicate undistorted shareholder choice in a
takeover context.3 Additionally,
[t]he Delaware General Assembly has recently adopted an amendment to
the Delaware General Corporation Law which provides that where
shareholders have adopted a majority voting bylaw for corporate elections
over the traditional plurality scheme, a corporation may not subsequently
amend its bylaws to return to plurality voting without shareholder
approval.4

While these initiatives may have little positive impact on stock prices,5
various efforts to strengthen shareholders’ power at the expense of insiders
have gained wider support in the wake of Enron, WorldCom and the

* Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law.
** Levy Fellow, George Mason University School of Law. Elizabeth McKay, Randall Clark,
Lloyd Cohen, Peter Henning, Bruce Johnsen, Michael Krauss and Joshua Wright provided helpful
comments on earlier drafts. The usual caveat applies. Our research was entirely supported by
funds provided by the Law & Economics Center at George Mason University School of Law.
1. See Press Release, Am. Bar Ass’n, Corporate Laws Committee Releases Preliminary
Report on Director Voting (Jan. 17, 2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/
buslaw/committees/CL270000pub/directorvoting/20060117000000.pdf.
2. Rachel McTague, Frank Urges Advisory Shareholder Vote on CEO Pay Gives Alternative
to Divestiture, 39 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 377 (Mar. 12, 2007).
3. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI.
L. REV. 973 (2002) (explaining an undistorted shareholder choice approach to corporate
takeovers).
4. John Verret, Pandora’s Ballot Box, or a Proxy with Moxie? The Majority Voting
Amendment to Delaware Corporate Law 1 (Bepress Legal Series, Working Paper No. 2015,
2007), available at http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/2015.
5. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr. & Young Sang Kim, Majority Voting for the Election of
Directors (Feb. 24, 2007) (unpublished article), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=962784
(offering an empirical study of market reaction to the adoption by firms of a majority voting
requirement for the election of directors and showing that, at least when shareholders lack veto
authority over candidates, these so-called reforms amount to little more than “smoke and
mirrors”).
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act.6 Given this environment and despite evidence that
verifies stronger corporate governance rules do not “unambiguously show
that corporate governance reduces the agency problems of moral hazard and
adverse selection,”7 much academic commentary supports such
shareholder-empowering governance initiatives.8 This is despite the
probability that most (but not all)9 initiatives ignore evidence showing that
separation of ownership and control justifies the current regime of limited
shareholder voting rights and director control as the default rule.10
Notwithstanding the blizzard of proposals aimed at strengthening
shareholder power, it is widely recognized that neither the notion of
shareholder ownership nor the assertion that stockholders are risk-bearing
residual claimants provides a convincing ground for shareholder primacy.11
“Active investor involvement in corporate decisionmaking seems likely to
disrupt the very mechanism that makes the public corporation practicable:
namely, the centralization of essentially non-reviewable decisionmaking
authority in the board of directors.”12 The business judgment rule rightly
effects a compromise between two competing values: authority and

6. See, e.g., Christopher M. Bruner, Good Faith, State of Mind, and the Outer Boundaries of
Director Liability in Corporate Law, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1131, 1131 (2006).
7. Valentina G. Bruno & Stijn Claessens, Corporate Governance and Regulation: Can There
Be Too Much of a Good Thing? 9 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No.
142/2007, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=956329. The authors further note that
agency cost problems “can arise from reverse causality, that is, companies [may] improve their
corporate governance practices . . . [as a commitment device] when raising new funds.” Or
alternatively they become more dependent on external financing, which may “trigger changes in
[the] companies’ corporate governance structures, in part . . . [because investors] require [such]
changes.” Id.
8. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 835, 847–50 (2005) (raising a number of proposals that might increase the power of
shareholders). But see, Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights,
53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 622–24 (2006) (pointing out the mechanical difficulties of achieving
consensus among thousands of shareholders impede their active role). See also Henry Hansmann
& Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001)
(“Chief among [the] pressures [for convergence in governance practices] is the recent dominance
of a shareholder-centered ideology of corporate law . . . . It is only a matter of time before its
influence is felt in the reform of corporate law as well.”).
9. For an innovative reform proposal that might maintain directors’ discretion in light of the
separation of ownership and control, but which might also help more properly align directorial
oversight, see Assaf Hamdani & Reinier Kraakman, Rewarding Outside Directors (Harvard John
M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 578, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=959210.
10. See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1735 (2006).
11. Antoine Rebérioux, Shareholder Primacy and Managerial Accountability 1–2
(Comparative Research in Law & Political Econ., Research Paper No. 01, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=961290 (suggesting, among other things, that “when contracts are
incomplete, non-shareholder constituencies—and in particular workers investing in specific
human capital—do bear risk”).
12. Bainbridge, supra note 10, at 1749.
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accountability.13 This compromise favors the director primacy model as the
best explanation of authority and disfavors (but does not necessarily
eliminate) accountability of shareholders. This suggests that contemporary
shareholder-empowerment initiatives unwisely endeavor to vindicate
accountability fears at the expense of necessary authority.
Some corporate governance proposals aimed at enhancing shareholder
participation appear to reflect discontent with traditional economics on the
one hand and an apparent embrace of the emerging literature on happiness
on the other.14 “Whereas economics assumes that people’s choices advance
their well-being, the happiness literature suggests that, in many settings
people make poor choices that undermine their happiness or subjective
well-being.”15 Corporate law scholar James McConvill emphasizes that this
emerging focus on happiness is simply a form of psychonomics.16
McConvill supplies analysis that appears to substantiate the happiness
literature’s critique of traditional economic assumptions that inform typical
corporate governance debates. His analysis serves to advance an ongoing
effort to empower shareholders and diminish the power of directors. Instead
of concentrating on economic return, McConvill proposes shareholder
participation as a happiness-realization vehicle in order to create a new
approach to corporate governance.
Far from endorsing the existing state of affairs, McConvill proposes a
novel corporate governance approach that issues forth as an endless process
of participation and self-discovery that forms a new normality: shareholder
empowerment as end in itself.17 While the satisfaction of selfish motives
remains an unruffled objective, material gain as a maxim is exchanged for
participatory experience. He disputes the judgment that “[a] business
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the
stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that
end.”18
In the traditional corporate model, shareholders have little room to
originate action or participate in corporate decisionmaking. McConvill
contests customary conceptions of rational choice analysis for
shareholders,19 and argues, “the perceived logic which encapsulates rational
13. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57
VAND. L. REV. 83, 85–87 (2004) (arguing that the business judgment rule is designed to effect a
compromise between two competing values: authority and accountability).
14. Mathew D. Adler & Eric Posner, Happiness Research and Cost-Benefit Analysis 1 (Univ.
of Pa. Law Sch., Scholarship at Penn Law Paper No. 167, 2007) available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/upenn/wps/papers/167 (providing background on happiness literature and
cost-benefit analysis).
15. Id.
16. James McConvill, Shareholder Empowerment As an End in Itself: A New Perspective on
Allocation of Power in the Modern Corporation, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1013, 1039–43 (2007).
17. Id. at 1015.
18. See id. at 1028 (quoting Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919)).
19. Id. at 1057–59.
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choice theory fails to appreciate the non-financial benefits that can be
derived from increasing shareholder power.”20 McConvill’s fresh look
requires explication and a critique.
In Part II, this article supplies comments regarding the authors’ understanding of economics. It then discusses economics’ limitations in
explaining human behavior, and outlines the prevailing terms of the
corporate governance debate. Part III supplies a general critique of
McConvill’s analysis. This Part examines McConvill’s failure to provide
empirical research that sustains his claim that shareholder empowerment is
a necessary ideal.21 This Part also examines the costs of increased
shareholder participation, including the costs incurred in initiating and
implementing changes to the current system and the related implications for
corporate performance. The evidence destabilizes McConvill’s contention
that increased shareholder participation can ever be a cost-free good. The
analysis concludes that social happiness through participation is an
optimizing problem, not a maximizing problem, so that more participation
is not necessarily better. This article is the first of a series of articles22
offering critical analysis to vitiate McConvill’s Panglossian conclusions.
II. EXAMINING THE BACKGROUND AND MCCONVILL’S
PARADIGM
A. BACKGROUND: PROVIDING A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
1. The Economic Cases For and Against Shareholder Passivity
and Separation of Ownership and Control
In order to grapple with the ideas and currents that ripple through
McConvill’s essay, it is helpful to appreciate that his article echoes an
emerging tension between active shareholder participation and passivity.
Traditional economics and cost-benefit analysis makes a case for
shareholder passivity in the face of organizational and transactional
complexity. Most scholars, since “the days of Adolph Berle and Gardiner
Means . . . have understood that in public corporations, shareholder
‘ownership’ does not mean shareholder control.”23 McConvill observes that
separation of ownership and control “naturally developed through the
simultaneous evolution of control in the hands of professional directors and

20. Id. at 1057.
21. Instead of empirical evidence linked to shareholders, McConvill provides implicit
analogies in the form of studies about participatory activities and their effects on human
happiness. See discussion infra Part II.A.
22. See, e.g., R. Sean Alley & Harry G. Hutchison, The High Costs of Shareholder
Participation (Nov. 7, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
23. Lynn Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence On Why Investors in
Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 667, 667–78 (2003).
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diminished [the] status of ownership, resulting from control being removed
as one of the characterizing features of property.”24 This trend was
accelerated by the dispersion of ownership—the absence of a single
shareholder with a large enough stake to exercise control—and
accompanied by managers holding only a small stake in the enterprise.25
McConvill asserts that the position of shareholders has changed from an
active to a passive role and shares of stock have become simple pieces of
paper that contain certain financial expectations but provide little or no
control over the physical property and the instruments of production of the
enterprise.26 The shares represent a financial interest in the affairs of the
corporation while allowing the firm’s directors and executives to get on
with managing the firm.27 Shareholders operate within a framework
characterized by bounded rationality and complexity, are widely dispersed,
have different time horizons and have difficulty reaching collective
decisions.28 Thus, typical corporate law scholarship implies that
shareholders are rationally apathetic,29 because they lack both the interest
and the incentive to “devote much time to, or to acquire significant
expertise in, the firm’s affairs.”30 Evidently shareholders, aware of their
own opportunity costs, decide not to trade their time for more corporate
participation. They primarily desire material well-being, which directors, as
platonic guardians, seek to maximize.31
24. McConvill, supra note 16, at 1019.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1020 (quoting ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 116 (rev. ed., 1967) (1932)).
27. See id. at 1021.
28. Harry G. Hutchison, Director Primacy and Corporate Governance: Shareholder Voting
Rights Captured by the Accountability/Authority Paradigm, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1111, 1201
(2005).
29. See Stout, supra note 23, at 673.
The typical public firm has thousands or even hundreds of thousands of shareholders.
How can these individuals reach a collective decision? Shareholder voting is slow,
difficult and expensive, even with modern information technology. In contrast, a board
of ten or twelve members can meet and vote on these issues relatively quickly, easily
and cheaply. . . . Director voting offers other important advantages over shareholder
voting as well. In the typical public firm, ownership is widely dispersed, with most
investors holding only a relatively small portion of the firm’s outstanding shares. As a
result, few shareholders have the incentive to devote much time to, or to acquire
significant expertise in, the firm’s affairs.
Id. See also Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 622–24 (pointing out the mechanical difficulties of
achieving consensus among thousands of shareholder impede their active role).
30. Stout, supra note 23, at 673; see also Hutchison, supra note 28, at 1201 (“The capability of
shareholders (as a disparate group) to manage relatively large corporations is hindered by
collective action problems tied to disparate preferences, different persuasive abilities, different
time horizons, as well as differing capacities to digest pertinent financial, microeconomic and
macroeconomic information even when widely available.”).
31. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 560 (2003).
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America’s leading corporate jurisdiction has adopted a particular
solution to accommodate separation of ownership and control. Delaware’s
General Corporation Law is grounded in the conclusion that “it is not
feasible for shareholders, the owners of the corporation, to exercise day-today power over the company’s business and affairs.”32 Although this
version of shareholder primacy, coupled with management by directors,
may be rooted in what Rebérioux calls the “philosophy of dispossession,”33
one might argue that “boards can . . . retain power pursuant [to] a . . .
corporate governance approach that allows contracting parties to agree in
advance via the corporate charter to allow the board to entrench itself.”34
Thus understood, shareholders engage in a form of private ordering called
“precommitment,” where they bind themselves “ex ante, . . . to improve
their collective position ex post.”35 However, board “[e]mpowerment has a
cost—it risks entrenchment and self-interested behavior, which may reduce
shareholder wealth. Hence, courts and shareholders are properly concerned
about accountability.”36
But accountability concerns alone cannot serve as the basis to empower
shareholders. While it is possible that the director-primacy model risks
increased agency costs37 in exchange for more managerial freedom of
initiative, leading to superior corporate performance,38 the shareholderprimacy model, if viable, contributes to ex post and ex ante inefficiencies.39
Stephen Bainbridge shows that the director primacy-based system of
corporate governance, as explained by the model of rational choice, has
served investors and society well.40 “[T]his record of success has occurred
not in spite of the separation of ownership and control, but because of that
separation.”41 Limited shareholder power is consistent with an accurate
32. UniSuper Ltd. v. News Corp., 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 205, at *25. (The Supreme Court of
Delaware accepts the conclusion that shareholders are both the true owners and the true principals
of the firm). But see Hutchison, supra note 28, at 1196–200 (disagreeing with this move because it
delimits beneficial risk-taking by the board of directors).
33. Rebérioux, supra note 11, at 5 (“This situation has led to an exclusive focus on the
question of control: how can the lost power be recovered?”); see also Hutchison, supra note 28, at
1175 (discussing the interplay between Unocal and Blasius and criticizing the validation of voting
rights independent of the shareholders’ contract rights because that might incorrectly imply
stockholder control and shareholder-based authority as the null hypothesis).
34. Hutchison, supra note 28, at 1114.
35. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Precommitment and Managerial Incentives: Corporate
Constitutionalism: Antitakeover Charter Provisions as Precommitment, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 473,
522 (2003).
36. Hutchison, supra note 28, at 1201.
37. Lynn Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV.
1189, 1200 (2002).
38. See, e.g., Bruno & Claessens, supra note 7, at 6–7, 39–46 (providing empirical evidence
on a cross-country basis indicating that optimal corporate governance does not imply either
greater regulation or greater accountability).
39. See Stout, supra note 37, at 1200–01.
40. Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 636.
41. Id. (emphasis added).
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description of how corporations work,42 as well as the necessity of
constraining accountability in order to preserve authority.43
This contractarian model is not without its critics. One scholar implies
the contractarian model is deficient because it is based largely on the
perfect-market assumption.44 However, though the market may be imperfect
and contract theory not flawless, similar or worse imperfections plague
other theories of corporate governance without responding adequately to the
authority-versus-accountability conflict. Contractarianism is grounded in
the conclusion that individual preferences lead to decisions that denote the
perceived preferences of the organizers and investors within the firm.
Contractarian analysis is informed by the director primacy model and
embraces shareholder weakness.45 In spite of the problems, and critics such
as Alchian and Demsetz,46 most commentators remain contractarians,47
animated by the belief in the necessity of fiat.48
Economic assumptions are embedded in the separation of ownership
and control paradigm. Tension surfaces because law and economics, as a
general rule, tend to produce distributive results that are not universally
agreed upon. Typical corporate governance models operate as forms of
private ordering that require hierarchs to make decisions. When directors
42. Bainbridge, supra note 10, at 1735.
43. KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 78 (1974).
44. Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later, 31 J.
CORP. L. 779, 781 (2006); see also Giulio Palermo, Misconceptions of Power: From Alchian and
Demsetz to Bowles and Gintis (Univ. of Brescia, Dept. of Econ., Discussion Paper 05/10, 2005),
available
at
http://www.unibs.it/on-line/dse/Home/Inevidenza/PaperdelDipartimento/
articolo3483.html.
45. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 10, at 1735.
46. Alchian and Demsetz’s property rights approach denies the existence of authority. For a
summary, see Palermo, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 2–4; see also Armen A.
Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization, 62
AMER. ECON. REV. 777 (1972).
It is common to see the firm characterized by the power to settle issues by fiat, by
authority, or by disciplinary action superior to that available in the conventional market.
This is delusion. The firm does not own all its inputs. It has no power of fiat, no
authority, no disciplinary action any different in the slightest degree from ordinary
market contracting between any two people.
Id. at 777. But see Oliver Williamson, Efficiency, Power, Authority and Economic Organization,
in TRANSACTION COSTS ECONOMICS AND BEYOND 33 (John Groenewegen, ed., 1996)
(suggesting that Alchian and Demsetz are wrong: “firms can and do exercise fiat that markets
cannot”).
47. We accept this description for purposes of corporate governance, but we do not necessarily
accept, for example, the external derivation of ideals that culminates in John Rawls
contractarianism. For an accessible discussion of these issues see NICHOLAS L.
GEORGAKOPOULOS, PRINCIPLES AND METHODS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: BASIC TOOLS FOR
NORMATIVE REASONING 25–27 (2005).
48. See, e g., William T. Allen, Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law, 50 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1395, 1400 (1993) (acknowledging that contractarianism is the “dominant legal
academic view”); see also, Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Bishops and the Corporate Stakeholder
Debate, 4 VILL. J. L. & INVESTMENT MGMT. 3, 13 (2002).
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make decisions that ostensibly benefit the firm and create shareholder
wealth, they engage in trade-offs that are protected by the business
judgment rule. However, corporate managers and the board often discover
their interests are not completely aligned with shareholders’, which raises
the specter of agency costs.49 This development is accompanied presumably
by unfair distributions, undemocratic decision-making and inadequate
control by capital holders. Thus, many observers challenge those economic
assumptions underlying the customary default rule of director
empowerment.
2. The Difficulty of Using Pure Economics to Explain Human
Behavior
Uncertainties coupled with introspective and public dissatisfaction,
have risen to prominence ever since Americans discovered that democracy
and radical human autonomy yield less than they promised. Critics of the
existing social and economic order, driven by social psychology or
otherwise, seek non-market solutions or advance proposals that are
disconnected with the price system in an effort to change the existing order.
This move appears to be grounded in the inability of standard economics
and market forces to justify a human life that appears, for all its
contemporary advantages, nasty, brutish, unfair and beyond the control of
individuals and, thus, without meaning. In other words, shareholders, like
other partly rational human agents, lead incompletely explained and
unfulfilled lives that conform to Aldous Huxley’s perdurable perception of
modern humanity.50 An individual’s sense of despair and unfairness and her
craving for alternative doors of perception may correlate inversely with her
sense of freedom.51 Since an individual’s sense of freedom and the
definition of freedom itself are apt to vary across the population, the
resultant disenchantment reflects the inability of any existing approach to
solve all problems or justify the current allocations of resources and the
current ends of economic institutions on terms that all will endorse.

49. See Stout, supra note 37, at 1200.
50. ALDOUS HUXLEY, THE DOORS OF PERCEPTION 62 (Harper & Row 1970) (1954) (“Most
men and women lead lives at the worst so painful, at the best so monotonous, poor and limited
that the urge to escape, the longing to transcend themselves if only for a few moments, is and has
always been one of the principal appetites of the soul.”).
51. Sebastiano Bavetta et al., Autonomy Freedom and Preferences for Redistribution 2–3 (Jan.
23, 2007) (unpublished article), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=958948.
People who enjoy autonomy have, to a large extent, control over their achievements so,
what they perceive as fair or unfair is likely to depend upon the degree of autonomy
they enjoy. . . . [Thus] the higher is the extent of autonomy freedom perceived by an
individual, the higher is the probability that he supports the view that larger income
differences are needed as incentives for individual effort.
Id.
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On one hand, classical economics implies that humans can be defined
and human capability can be measured by the concept of rationality.52
Rationality presupposes the capacity of individual choice.53 On the other
hand, notions of revealed preferences and rational utility maximization
materialize potentially as an empty suit. The distributional consequences
and the dissatisfying implications for human life in a postmodern age,
where individuals are unable to experience the happiness that material
goods and consumption once fostered, are troubling. The foundational
notion of rational economic man and its implied norm, “wealth
maximization,” have come under attack. This assault persists despite the
fact that rational choice implicates the fulfillment of both pecuniary and
nonpecuniary wants.54
On one account, “[e]conomics can be distinguished from other social
sciences by the belief that most . . . behavior can be explained by assuming
that agents have stable, well-defined preferences and make rational choices
consistent with those preferences in markets that (eventually) clear.”55
Additionally, “[e]conomics has assumed that all men pursue their private
interest[s].”56 That is to say, they aim to maximize something, but what that
something is, is debatable.57 The field of law and economics frequently
explains outcomes via wealth maximization rather than social welfare
maximization.58 Others endeavor to diminish contractarian explanations of
corporate law by invoking trust.59 Intuitively, trust with its moral
52. Sandra J. Peart & David M. Levy, Attitudes Towards Race, Hierarchy and Transformation
in the 19th Century, 47 HIST. ECON. THOUGHT 15, 18 (2005).
53. Id.
54. Bruce E. Kaufman, Expanding the Behavioral Foundations of Labor Economics, 52
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 361, 363 (1999).
55. Id. at 364.
56. DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II, at 1 (1989).
57. Adam Smith may be the source of this debate. See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF
MORAL SENTIMENTS 1 (Dover Publications, Inc. 2006) (1759) (“However selfish soever man may
be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of
others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the
pleasure of seeing it.”).
58. Christine Jolls, Behavioral Law and Economics 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 12879, 2007), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w12879 (suggesting
that the focus on the maximization of wealth rather than social welfare is driven by the conclusion
that the distributional issues that bear on social welfare can be best addressed through the tax
system). As an elementary matter of course,
[t]he idea of a social welfare function is part of normative economics . . . [beginning]
with the fundamental idea of utility as a conception or measure of the good. Economists
may disagree about the nature of utility, the relationship of utility to social welfare, and
the role of welfare in public policy, but most (if not all) economists would assent to the
abstract proposition that ceteris paribus more utility is a good thing.
Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon, http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/ (last visited Nov.
19, 2007).
59. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REV.
595 (1997).
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underpinnings, provides non-pecuniary benefits and implicates richer
normative values than monetary wealth-maximization.60
Disappointed perhaps by the debate over ordinal or cardinal utility61 as
well as the non-interpersonal comparability of such measures commentators
conclude, “An important step in expanding the traditional analysis of
individual rational choice is to incorporate into the theory a much richer
class of attitudes, preferences, and calculations.”62 Dissatisfaction with the
notion of revealed preference and rational utility maximization is grounded
in the premise that people often do not know what is in their interest.63 This
development is related to the concepts of bounded rationality, bounded
willpower and bounded self-interest.64 Bounded rationality reflects the
limited cognitive abilities that constrain human problem-solving. Bounded
willpower captures the fact that people sometimes make choices that are not
in their long-run interest. Bounded self-interest incorporates the fact that
humans are often willing to sacrifice their own interests to help others.65
Human irrationality thus presents an epistemological challenge to any
pretensions of normative economic analysis,66 including existing
shareholder-participation rights.
While such critiques of normative economic analysis are valid, attempts
to undermine the notion of the rational decision-maker must tackle an
endogenicity problem: Unless they come from a different gene pool than
the rest of us, the architects of such critiques face the risk that their analysis
is tainted by their own irrationality.67 Furthermore, while economics has

60. Id. at 604.
61. For an explanation of cardinal and ordinal measurement, see, e.g., Ralph Byrns, Cardinal
Measures and Ordinal Measures, http://www.unc.edu/depts/econ/byrns_web/Economicae/Essays/
CardOrdinal.htm (Cardinal measurement of utility assumes satisfaction is measurable in absolute
number. That is, it provides a constant and reasonably objective measure of utility. Ordinal
measurement of utility assumes that “[s]atisfaction is not cardinally measurable. Instead, relative
numbers provide rankings . . . .”).
62. Kaufman, supra note 54, at 362 (internal quotation omitted).
63. For an incisive discussion of this issue and related ones, see Lloyd R. Cohen, The Lure of
the Lottery, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 705, 737–44 (2001).
64. See Sendhil Mullainathan & Richard H. Thaler, Behavioral Economics (Mass. Inst. of
Tech. Dept. of Econ., Working Paper No. 00-27, 2000), available at http://www.economics.
harvard.edu/faculty/mullainathan/papers/Encyclopedia.pdf.
65. Id. Indeed it appears “that [if] human consciousness has content and character and . . . it is
not an empty box, there is no limit to the range of human activity that can be found wanting.”
Cohen, supra note 63, at 737. This includes such puzzles as why dozens of drivers bypass
petroleum-based diesel stations for more expensive biodiesel at Dr. Dan’s Alternative Fuel Werks,
see id., or why John Dober and David Nitschman, Moravian missionaries, were prepared to sell
themselves into slavery in order to reach the slaves of the West Indies. See David Smithers, Count
Zinzendorf and the Moravians, Awake and Go! Global Prayer Network, http://www.watchword.
org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=48&Itemid=48.
66. Cohen, supra note 63, at 737.
67. See,
e.g.,
Free
Exchange:
Problem
or
Solution?,
ECONOMIST.COM,
http://www.economist.com/debate/freeexchange/2007/02/problem_or_solution.cfm
(discussing
the issue of rational decision making within the context of government).
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much to say about social welfare in a broad sense, it cannot explain all of
life. Although some commentators imply that human self-interest can be
explained simply as avaricious greed or monetary self-interest,68 a more
complete description of human rationality should admit a wider array of
explanations for the choices humans make. Simple material gain supplies
only “one of many motives propelling economic [and other] activity.”69 It
seems that “a richer appreciation of self-interest helps to explain human
behavior in the contemporary world.”70 Still, the controversy concerning the
source and consequences of individual choice persists.
B. MCCONVILL’S CLAIMS
1. Shareholder Participation As The New Goal
In response to this controversy, new or hybrid fields have developed to
fill perceived epistemic voids in the study of the distribution of goods and
the provision of human welfare. These developments have led to social
psychology, which in combination with economics, morphs into behavioral
economics71 or psychonomics. Commentators have expressed concern
about the absence of active participation. Some have insisted that citizens
must not be mere passive beneficiaries, but instead must be active
participants in the control process.72 The theory proceeds as follows:
diminished participation leads to diminished happiness. In his effort to fill
the perceived “happiness” void in western societies,73 McConvill offers a
rather open-ended form of shareholder participation as a fulfillment device.
The two most important institutions in America’s politico-economic
system, democracy and the market, make individual preferences decisive in
the formation of policy and the allocation of resources.74 In corporate law
68. Cf. DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 7 (1991) (implying that self-interest simply means avaricious greed in a simple
monetary sense as opposed to ideological/nonmaterial considerations).
69. Harry G. Hutchison, A Clearing in the Forest: Infusing the Labor Union Dues Dispute
with First Amendment Values, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1309, 1312 (2006).
70. Id.
71. See Mullainathan & Thaler, supra note 64.
72. CHRISTOPHER SHANNON, CONSPICUOUS CRITICISM: TRADITION, THE INDIVIDUAL, AND
CULTURE IN MODERN AMERICAN SOCIAL THOUGHT 121 (rev. ed., Univ. of Scranton Press 2006)
(1996) (describing but not agreeing with this move).
73. See McConvill, supra note 16, at 1039–57.
74. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference-Based Legal Policy, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 4, 4
(1994). Hovenkamp asserts that there are two sub-disciplines within legal study that have come to
reflect the importance of preferences in our governmental system: law and economics and the
theory of public choice.
Under neoclassical economics, the only human needs or wishes taken into account are
those expressed through ‘revealed preference,’ or utility maximization, where ‘utility’
is understood as the individual’s rank ordering of preferences. . . . [T]he theory of
public choice . . . also applies economic theory, but this time to the behavior of voting,
or political, markets. The model of public choice assumes that voters vote their
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and prevailing modes of corporate governance, individual choice is
reflected in contractarianism.75 Typically, in large, publicly traded firms, the
preferences that, under the contractarian model, drive corporate
decisionmaking76 yield governance structures where directors and
managers, assisted by the business judgment rule,77 direct and participate.
Shareholders rarely initiate activity. There is a limited role for shareholders
in ensuring that “corporate decisions are unbiased, informed, established in
good faith, [and] made in the[ir] best interest.”78 This limited role is
vindicated by shareholder ability to file derivative actions to redress alleged
corporate injuries for breach of fiduciary duties.79
However, this limited role prompts dissatisfaction.80 Commentators
thus have engaged in a pressing search for alternative conceptions of
corporate governance that would justify a more robust role for shareholders.
This search has led to a “series of recent initiatives in the United States to
increase the participatory rights, and hence the power, of shareholders,”81
including McConvill’s proposal.82
On one level McConvill appears to be a contractarian who accepts the
possibility that the existing default rules may accord with the preferences of
shareholders.83 On another, he is dissatisfied with the customary outcome of
this contractual exchange. He accepts the claim that greater personal
happiness comes “when participating with other[s] . . . to build . . .

preferences, or that elected representatives behave in a way that will maximize their
chances for re-election or for some other enhancement of their position.
Id. at 4–5.
75. See supra Part II.A.1 for a brief discussion of contractarianism.
76. Id.
77. One argument in favor of the business judgment rule is that in its absence, “officers and
directors would fail to make the risk-neutral business decisions desired by investors who can limit
their overall investment risk through diversification.” Jolls, supra note 58, at 27.
78. Harry G. Hutchison, Presumptive Business Judgment, Substantive Good Faith, Litigation
Control: Vindicating the Socioeconomic Meaning of Harhen v. Brown, 26 J. CORP. L. 285, 286
(2001).
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., scholars cited infra note 82.
81. McConvill, supra note 16, at 1013.
82. Other articles that advocate greater shareholder empowerment include Lucian Bebchuk,
The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 8; Bebchuk, supra note 3 (asserting that
once undistorted shareholder choice is ensured by requiring the hostile bidder to win a shareholder
vote, boards should not have a veto over takeover bids); Lucian Bebchuk, John Coates IV &
Guhan Subramanian, The Anti-Takeover Power of Classified Boards: Theory, Evidence and
Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887 (2002) (the combination of poison pills and a staggered board that
exists in a majority of publicly traded firms acts as a powerful anti-takeover device requiring
correction in the form of shareholder empowerment). But see Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism
About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 564 (2006) (challenging the claim
of shareholder primacists that reapportioning corporate governance power away from boards of
directors and toward shareholders will benefit shareholders as a class).
83. McConvill, supra note 16, at 1062 (suggesting that shareholders could change the terms of
the contract).
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‘relational goods’,”84 and contends that the pursuit of happiness is the
ultimate objective of human beings.85 Thus, participation rather than
passivity is the rational choice for shareholders.86 He emphasizes that
shareholders, in addition to purchasing a risk-adjusted economic return for
their capital investment, should have the right to participate in the firm’s
governance and decision-making if they so wish. Dividing shareholder
purchases into categories of material and experiential goods, participation
rights become an experiential purchase leading to relational goods that
augment the happiness and welfare of shareholders.87 Consequently,
shareholder participation ought to become an end in itself.
McConvill’s paradigm asserts the right for shareholders to demand (and
the obligation of corporations to accommodate) participation, wherein
shareholders achieve enhanced happiness benefits in combination with
undiminished material gains. He posits a floating nodal point of synthesis88
between director and shareholder primacy. Theoretically, his proposal
would allow ultimate control to remain in the hands of directors/managers
as opposed to shareholders. But the centripetal tendency of his approach
necessarily shrinks directorial control and insists on shareholder
participation as the new ordering principle.
McConvill’s model can be depicted by the following: Participation
requires the interaction of others and happiness varies with the level of this
interaction.89
Even if active involvement in the corporation seems less desirable at the
time [of purchase] than sitting back and collecting the dividend check,
empirical findings . . . show that when looking back on the decision,
shareholders, even in the largest of corporations, are likely to be happier
by following the participation path.90

McConvill further contends that relational goods like investor
participation can be purchased without any costs to either shareholders or
the firm.91 Hence, economic returns to the firm remain unaffected.
McConvill emphasizes the argument that the value of participation has been
either inappropriately or incompletely addressed.92 He suggests that applied
psychonomics favors shareholder participation.93 Within the corporate
governance debate, psychonomics theoretically reflects the disavowal of

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 1043.
See id. at 1039–43, 1059.
Id. at 1059.
See id. at 1053–56.
See SHANNON, supra note 72, at 166 (describing a perspective on social science).
See McConvill, supra note 16, at 1043.
Id. at 1059.
Id. at 1056.
Id. at 1013–17.
Id. at 1015.
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individual preferences (narrowly described) in collective determination and
the prescription of the appropriate governance regime. This rejection is
premised on an imaginative conception that human cravings underlie
psychological accounts of human wants. Whichever studies are used,
psychonomics and happiness studies94 imply that shareholders ought to
enjoy greater, longer-lasting happiness by using their shares to create a
participatory role in the corporation.95 Eschewing the rational-choice model
of the human agent, McConvill contests the conclusion that shareholders
are rationally apathetic and introduces greater psychological complexity
into the model of the human agent.96 He concludes that “happiness theory”
and psychonomics together imply that neither shareholder wealth
maximization nor the protection of stakeholders’ interest(s) ought to occupy
the high ground in debates about corporate governance.97
While we agree that Enlightenment progress98 can be illusory, this
critique of human rationality is of a piece with Professor Gedicks’
observation that contemporary attempts to overcome post-Enlightenment
gloom reflect the postmodern conclusion that our world has fallen apart and
that we live at the end of the neoclassical age as society struggles through
the aftermath of confusion and helplessness wherein the real world,
including the world of economics, lacks reality.99 Manifestly influenced by
this intuition, McConvill emphasizes this paradoxical claim: Society should
move away from the self-referential world of economics and embrace a
different kind of rationality that is even more enlightened and more
considered as the axiomatic forces of neoclassicalism are placed on the
run.100 He offers a “new” paradigm of rationality. “Rather than a decision
being rational because an economist thinks it is, a decision is rational
because it is in [the] best interests of the decision-maker.”101 This fuels an
inescapable question: Who ought to be the appropriate decision-maker—the
shareholders or McConvill and the other members of the psychonomical
community?

94. Psychonomics may take many forms but appears to include exploring the intellectual
interface between economics, psychology and other behavioral and social science disciplines. See,
e.g., Kaufman, supra note 54, at 361–62.
95. See McConvill, supra note 16, at 1039.
96. Id. at 1057–58.
97. See id. at 1015, 1061.
98. See, e.g., SHANNON, supra note 72, at 196 (Among the Enlightenment fictions is the notion
“that morality has an objective basis apart from any spiritual or ontological order. . . .” Therefore
achieving progress in the “quest for a moral order initially saw its tasks as getting people to
behave properly, but it has subsequently foundered on the problem of what precisely constitutes
proper conduct.”).
99. Fredrick Mark Gedicks, Spirituality, Fundamentalism, Liberty: Religion at the End of
Modernity, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1197, 1197–98 (2006).
100. McConvill, supra note 16, at 1058.
101. Id.
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2. McConvill as a Possible Third Option in the Shareholder
Primacy/Director Primacy Debate?
If one can refrain from concluding that McConvill’s theory is fatally
counterintuitive and lacks persuasive evidence, one notes that many
corporate law scholars are animated either by shareholder-primacy norms102
or by director-primacy reality.103 Assuming the soundness of McConvill’s
proposal, it may provide a “third way” forward by specifying a model that
simultaneously achieves wealth maximization and provides an independent
nonmaterial source of shareholder happiness.
Leading shareholder primacists concede the possibility, but reject the
defensibility, of the “third way.” Bebchuk states: “Some supporters of
shareholder access have ‘shareholder voice’ and ‘corporate democracy’ as
objectives. But the case for shareholder access does not depend on having
such objectives.”104 Instead, he concentrates “on the sole objective of
effective corporate governance that enhances corporate value.”105 Implicit
in Bebchuk’s approach is the affirmation that providing space for more
robust shareholder activity and decision-making leads to value-enhancing
corporate behavior.106 In contrast, Bainbridge’s director-primacy framework
separates accountability from authority and contends that shareholders
have, and ought to have, a very limited role in corporate governance and
concludes that shareholder empowerment fails to offer the benefit of
improved corporate performance.107 Both Bebchuk’s and Bainbridge’s
approaches provide testable hypotheses. Nevertheless, McConvill contests
both claims by maintaining that shareholder participation can be
accommodated “without unduly interfering with the traditional default rule
of managerial authority [which is] the best guarantee of corporate
performance.”108 He insists that any allegation that shareholders are
rationally apathetic, and therefore, that shareholder empowerment is not
102. See, e.g., D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 278
(1998) (“[S]hareholders claim the corporation’s heart. This shareholder-centric focus of corporate
law is often referred to as shareholder primacy.”). See also Bebchuk, supra note 3, at 974–77.
103. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 86.
The director primacy model describes the corporation as a vehicle by which the board
of directors hires various factors of production. The board of directors is not an agent of
the shareholders; rather, the board is the embodiment of the corporate principal, serving
as the nexus of the various contracts making up the corporation.
Id.

104. Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS. LAW. 43, 44
(2003).
105. Id.
106. Consistent with Bebchuk’s intuition but not necessarily his view, some cross-country
empirical evidence derived from a large number of firms from different countries shows that
appropriate corporate governance acts as a monitoring and discipline device, ensuring that
management pursues value-maximizing goals. See Bruno & Claessens, supra note 7, at 1–5.
107. Bainbridge, supra note 10, at 1735, 1748–49.
108. McConvill, supra note 16, at 1057.
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warranted, is an “intellectually lazy argument” because it rests on a simple,
overly narrow assumption that shareholders are interested primarily in
wealth maximization.109
III. A GENERAL CRITIQUE
There are a number of problems with McConvill’s analysis. He avoids
presenting any empirical evidence that substantiates the claim that
shareholder empowerment is necessary, and refuses to deal with
shareholders as they are—a disparate group with often inharmonious and
incommensurable interests. He also fails to provide a convincing theory that
delineates how material goods can be transformed into experiential ones.
Hence, the debate is grounded in cloudy, if not conflicting, terms.
McConvill also ignores the costs of shareholder participation, including
coordination cost as well as the cost resulting from the search for private
benefits.
A. THE ABSENCE OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
McConvill presents more than twenty studies as references. However,
none of the studies deal directly with whether shareholders desire
McConvill’s preferred outcome of shareholder participation. He does
provide information derived from Tim Kasser’s book, The High Price of
Materialism;110 Bruni & Stanca’s study examining human acquisition of
relational goods as opposed to watching television;111 investigations derived
from brain scans recording how certain events or sensations impact the
parts of the brain that generate happiness or sorrow;112 and discussions of
positive psychology and the law, which suggest that a high degree of
liberty, allowing individuals to pursue individual goals, is important for
enabling individuals to pursue happiness.113 While these studies provide
descriptions of what makes people happy in general terms, they are entirely
without any direct connection to shareholders as a group and the allocationof-corporate power debate in particular. None of the studies show why
providing participatory activities within a corporate governance context is
essential. The evidence presented fails to support a defensible prescription
for the allocation of power debate that favors shareholder empowerment.

109. Id.
110. TIM KASSER, THE HIGH PRICE OF MATERIALISM (2002).
111. Luigino Bruni & Luca Stanca, Watching Alone: Relational Goods, Television and
Happiness (Univ. of Biocca, Econ. Dept. Working Paper,
http://dipeco.economia.unimib.it/pdf/pubblicazioni/wp90_05.pdf.
112. McConvill, supra note 16, at 1041.
113. Id. at 1041, 1043.

2005),

available

at
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B. SHAREHOLDERS ARE A DISPARATE GROUP
Even if one finds evidence that shows that retail, institutional, shortterm and long-term shareholders are captivated by the compulsion to
participate, however, it is likely that some shareholders will view
participation in different ways than others. This exposes McConvill’s
paradigm to interest divergence. Shareholders committed to happiness may
have differing definitions of what happiness means for them, as well as
differing ideas about how much and what type of participation is required in
order to generate the happiness they seek. Participation by individual or
institutional shareholders who are animated by divergent interests may have
adverse implications for the community of shareholders. McConvill (like
many shareholder primacists), ignores this fact and presumes that
reapportioning corporate governance power away from boards of directors
and toward shareholders will benefit shareholders as a class.114
Most shareholder primacists “contend that shareholders would like
managers to maximize the long-term value of their shares, but that
managers are unlikely to do so because their interests are insufficiently
aligned with those of shareholders.”115 Solving this agency-cost problem
requires increasing shareholder power116 with the objective of maximizing
shareholder value in some largely material sense.117 McConvill supports
shareholder empowerment, but not as a solution to the agency-cost
question. In contrast to typical shareholder primacists, McConvill
concentrates on shareholder empowerment for a different purpose:
maximization of life experiences. Expanding shareholder power solves a
different problem—the happiness void in western societies118—by
providing necessary relational goods for shareholders. But his program
suffers from the same error as that of other shareholder primacists’: They
all119 underplay “deep rifts among the interests of large blockholders, those
shareholders most likely to exercise shareholder power.”120 He also ignores
differences between institutional and individual shareholders.
In addition, McConvill and other shareholder primacists refuse to
recognize their theory’s ignorance of interest divergence. The “case for
increasing shareholder power assumes that shareholders would overcome
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

See Anabtawi, supra note 82, at 561–99 (discussing this issue fully).
Id. at 562.
Id.
Id. at 564.
See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 8, at 891. Bebchuk, perhaps the leading shareholder
primacist, argues that “shareholders are much more homogenous in their interests than are voters
in the political system.” Id.
120. Anabtawi, supra note 82, at 564. McConvill’s unwillingness to recognize differences
among shareholders is especially odd because he does recognize at least two groups of investors,
those who would like to participate for happiness’ sake and those who would not. See McConvill,
supra note 16, at 1059 (“[P]articipation will, of course, not appeal to all shareholders.”).
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collective action problems to make use of the power being transferred to
them.”121 Stephen Bainbridge clarifies:
All organizations must have some mechanism for aggregating the
preferences of the organization’s constituencies and converting them into
collective decisions. As Professor Kenneth Arrow explains such
mechanisms fall out on a spectrum between “consensus” and “authority.”
Authority-based decisionmaking structures, which are characterized by a
central agency empowered to make decisions binding on the firm as a
whole, tend to arise when the firm’s constituencies face information
asymmetries and have differing interests. Because the corporation
demonstrably satisfies those conditions, vesting the power of fiat in a
central decisionmaker is the essential characteristic of its governance.122

Public corporations raise capital from widely dispersed or atomized
shareholders.123 Information asymmetry coupled with a diversity of
perspectives presents difficulties for collective rationality and collective
action. Collective action problems could be surmounted through
coordination, but coordination generally is impractical to achieve in the
context of widely dispersed ownership.124 In publicly traded firms, it is only
desirable for shareholders to attempt to discipline managers when it
becomes collectively desirable to do so because the collective benefits
exceed the costs.125 Participation as a social good, jointly produced by a
corporation and its shareholders, surfaces as a difficult proposition because
of “the incommensurability and incomplete communicability of human
wants and values.”126
A further problem with realizing shareholders’ “common” interests is
the existence of significant private, or individual, interests.127 For example,
Bebchuk contends management may often trade shareholder premia in
exchange for personal benefits that they can obtain by ending their filibuster
against a takeover.128 There is little reason to presume that shareholders,
given the power to more fully participate in corporate decisions, would act
differently. Like many shareholder primacists, McConvill overlooks the
possibility that investors with “significant private interests” and sufficient
incentives might “use any incremental power conferred upon them to
pursue those interests to the detriment of shareholders as a class.”129
Enlarged shareholder power can be transformed into a vehicle to
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Anabtawi, supra note 82, at 571.
Bainbridge, supra note 10, at 1745.
Anabtawi, supra note 82, at 572.
Id.
Id.
ARROW, supra note 43, at 24.
Anabtawi, supra note 82, at 564.
Bebchuk, supra note 8, at 899–900 (citing Jay Hartzell et al., What’s In It for Me? CEOs
Whose Firms Are Acquired, 17 REV. FIN. STUD. 37, 57 (2004)).
129. Anabtawi, supra note 82, at 564.
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subordinate overall shareholder material welfare, as some shareholders
increase their participation in order to secure private benefits. This
quandary is sharpened in the presence of institutional investors driven by a
supposed happiness objective. Participation yields private benefits which
are not shared equally by all shareholders. This outcome may be the
opposite of what McConvill predicts.130
The prospect of receiving a disproportionate share of returns (either
material or psychological) provides an incentive for shareholders to
overcome collective action problems through rent-seeking, which can take a
financial or non-financial shape.131 Disparate interests require a mediating
structure that is capable of adjudicating among the potentially endless
varieties of shareholder interests. McConvill simply ignores coordination
issues and the existing role of directors in conciliating the conflicting
interests of shareholders.132 His scaffold, properly juxtaposed against the
probability that selfish-motives can be transmuted into private benefits and
collective costs, seems conspicuously fragile.
C. THE COSTS OF MCCONVILL’S PROGRAM
McConvill asserts that participation ought to be encouraged and
accommodated because it makes people happy.133 However, discovering the
amount of participation that increases happiness the most is an optimizing
problem, not a maximizing problem. More participation, therefore, is not
necessarily better. Participation by shareholders or others is costly in many
ways. It is unclear how McConvill would evaluate the happiness of
different groups of shareholders. Compounding this issue are the costs of
coordinating participation incurred by the investors and the firm itself. For
example, participation by individual shareholders with divergent interests
imposes costs on, and reduces the happiness of, the community of
shareholders. Since these costs accumulate as the amount of participation
increases, it stands to reason that, beyond some point at least, it makes
sense to stop promoting it.
By way of example, imagine a very simple company, Widgets
Transnational, with only two investors, person A and person B. Each
investor has a utility function that determines how happy she is with her
life. Assume A’s and B’s happiness is affected by only a few things,
including participation. Then:
UA = f[WealthA (LaborA, InvestmentsA (PA, PB)), HealthA, PA, PB]; and
UB = f[WealthB (LaborB, InvestmentsB (PA, PB)), HealthB, PA, PB],

130.
131.
132.
133.

See id. at 565.
See, e.g., id. at 575–77.
Id. at 564.
McConvill, supra note 16, at 1043, 1059.
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where U = utility, P = participation, and A’s and B’s participation agendas
may differ. While participating in their own life experiences could be a
positive factor for both A and B, it is not the only thing that promotes their
respective happiness. Furthermore, the positive and negative effects of each
one’s participation are not fully internalized. A’s utility is a function of her
own wealth, health, participation, and of B’s participation. A is happier
when she is wealthier, healthier, and can participate more. A may or may
not be happier due to B’s participation, but it could affect her in some direct
way (positively or negatively). More importantly, A’s wealth is a function
of her own labor and investments. Her investment returns are a function of
her participation and the participation of B. Because participation is costly,
any participation by A or B in A’s investments may be negatively related to
A’s wealth, and thus, to her happiness.134 So, B’s participation affects A’s
happiness both directly, in whatever way A feels about B’s participation,
and indirectly by reducing the value of A’s wealth (which reduces her
happiness).
A related problem is that participation invites rent-seeking. Under a
participatory scheme, shareholders and managers may strategically
withhold information from one another.135 There is also the risk that making
divergent stakeholders privy to insider information leads to leaks of
valuable private information to the workforce, competitors, or the public at
large.136 Such leaks can lower profits due to higher wages and strategic
responses from competitors.137 Also, activist shareholders can provoke
companies to pay them to stop participating or to stop leaking
information.138 This raises the costs of doing business and139 may also
discourage stakeholders from transmitting information among
themselves.140 This, of course, has a negative feedback effect on other
investors who invest solely for profit (most of them). It seems unlikely that
McConvill would support this sort of extortive behavior, which is closely
tied to his program.141
Acknowledging that most publicly traded corporations have thousands
more investors than the simple company, it is likely that the overall
transaction and coordination costs derived from the participation of large
numbers of shareholders, as well as the rent-seeking encouraged thereby,
reduce the happiness benefits that accrue to the community of shareholders.
Shareholder participation is likely to be expensive to, among others, the

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

See Alley & Hutchison, supra note 22, at 3.
Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 607.
Id. at 609.
Id.
Bainbridge, supra note 10, at 1754.
Anabtawi, supra note 82, at 566.
Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 609.
See generally McConvill, supra note 16, at 1038–59.
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participating investor, other investors, and the companies that allow
participation.142
Investors as a class are made up of small- and medium-sized individual
investors, public employee pension funds, unions, and others, all with
differing time horizons, objectives and conceptions of happiness.
Reconfiguring the purchase of stock as well as corporate governance to
satisfy McConvill’s stated preference for participatory activities would
require the investment of scarce economic resources, including time, by
shareholders and shareholder groups (mutual funds, unions, and pension
funds) to gather information, deliberate and convey their views on corporate
issues to management.143 This would reduce the amount of time that they
could spend on alternative participatory or nonparticipatory activities. As a
rule, “shareholders lack incentives to gather the information necessary to
actively participate in decisionmaking. A rational shareholder will expend
the effort necessary to make informed decisions only if the expected
benefits of doing so outweigh the costs.”144 McConvill’s approach
necessarily requires interpersonal utility comparisons and mandates the
weighing of the happiness benefits against the costs of human suffering that
necessarily accompany the implementation of this scheme. His failure to
address this fact is a significant weakness in his theory.
Our intuition also suggests greater shareholder participation would
negatively affect corporate performance. If true, this refutes McConvill’s
claim that shareholder wealth maximization remains unaffected.145
McConvill argues investment of scarce economic/psychological resources
by shareholders would not hinder economic returns, because increasing
shareholder power emerges within a sustainable (material) wealthmaximization framework, within which shareholders (possibly risking
happiness-inducing participatory experiences) decline to interfere unduly
with the default rule of managerial/directorial authority.146 Nonetheless, he
contends this development fashions an appealing proposition that allows
shareholders, “to have their cake, and help bake it too.”147 That is, they gain
the psychological benefits of participation while retaining all of the
expected material benefits that are derived from managerial/directorial fiat
and the wealth maximization norm. This claim ignores the direct costs to
shareholders, as well as the external costs of increased shareholder
participation that are borne by the corporations who endure it. These costs
are ultimately passed on to the participatory investor as well as all of the
142. Shareholder participation is likely to be costly for the economy at large as well as other
institutions. See id.
143. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
144. Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 623.
145. McConvill, supra note 16, at 1058–59.
146. Id. at 1053.
147. Id.

62

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 2

other shareholders of the corporation, necessarily, therefore, reducing their
respective material gains.
There are other problems with McConvill’s assertion that increased
shareholder participation does not affect the bottom line. Potential creditors
will not lend to firms with less accountable managers without compensation
for the risks posed by the lack of accountability.148 Investors are provided
governance arrangements, and these arrangements are rolled into the price
of the stock. If the arrangements are stacked against investors, the stock
price will be discounted. Using governance terms preferred by investors
reduces the firm’s cost of capital by attracting a higher price for the
securities.149 In the face of participation, the cost of capital rises due to less
favorable borrowing terms, and earnings fall. Another cost of participation
is eternal surveillance. This requires the acquisition and digestion of
information by dispersed and diverse individuals, which imposes costs on
either participants or shareholders, and consequently reduces shareholder
welfare.150 Given the apparent unsupportability of McConvill’s proposition,
it seems unlikely that there is any place in corporate governance for
increased shareholder power, if it does not aim to strengthen the bottom
line, but instead aims at enhancing something else.
D. OTHER DIFFICULTIES
Other difficulties remain. First, McConvill’s analysis lacks clarity with
respect to what constitutes an appropriate conception of happiness. Second,
he fails to untangle the impact of human choice and intent for purposes of
ascertaining the goal associated with a given stock purchase. Finally,
McConvill neglects to describe how one determines the constitutive
components of an experiential good as opposed to a material one.
1. What Is (Or Should Be) “Happiness”?
In his pallid attempt to address what happiness consists of, McConvill
asserts, “[i]n the normal scheme of things, law should be evaluated by one
criterion: its capacity to promote human well-being, or ‘happiness.’”151 He
contributes to the vagueness of this enterprise152 by relying, ostensibly, on
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. McConvill claims that Aristotle favors
happiness as a first principle that consists of virtuous activities.153 This
approach intimates that morality dictates that happiness is the primary
objective of humans and leads to the conclusion that only virtuous activities
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Bainbridge, supra note 10, at 1736.
Id. at 1739.
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
McConvill, supra note 16, at 1039.
Id. at 1039–40 (“[H]appiness has always been viewed as being too vague and subjective to
provide pointed answers regarding the things that are conducive to human flourishing.”).
153. Id. at 1040.

2007]

Against Shareholder Participation

63

have the capacity to produce happiness. Happiness-desiring humans,
therefore, ought to prefer virtuous activities to less virtuous ones. Later,
however, McConvill invokes a largely hedonic conception of utilitarianism:
happiness consists of obtaining more pleasure with the absence of pain,
where human satisfaction is tied to whatever goals an individual sets
forward.154 This statement suggests that happiness-desiring humans should
maximize pleasure constrained only by the possible infliction of pain,
regardless of virtuousness. McConvill asserts that though “individuals live
their lives in a variety of different ways, these different pursuits have a
common goal: the fulfillment of happiness. Each of us engages in different
types of ‘need expression’, but our central or overriding need is to be
happy.”155 He provides little reason why Americans committed to
autonomy, or shareholders in particular, would favor his understanding
rather than Mill’s opinion that “happiness cannot result from seeking
pleasure as an end in itself, but must result from the pursuit of higher
goals.”156 McConvill fails to explain, however, whether he is driven by the
necessity of finding and encouraging virtuous activities, or energized by
utilitarianism as a wide-ranging theory that could include hedonic or other
conceptions.
Second, McConvill insists the goals associated with the purchase of
stock are defined exclusively by human choice and intent.157 He asserts that
individuals actually choose to structure their lives to pursue material goods
when what they really should be doing is focusing their attention on
building relational ones.158 Bafflingly, he states that human choice/intent
can transmute a material good into a relational one, while he simultaneously
reprimands corporations that offer, and shareholders who accept, the
“choice” of purchasing stock that primarily provides material benefits.
McConvill’s assertion that shareholders’ “true” interests (happinessproducing activities) are missing in this contractual exchange model only
contributes to this puzzle. McConvill’s psychonomics are disjunctive,
because if shareholders do not know their own interests, why will they have
reason to choose participatory goods as an alternative to material ones, even
assuming participatory goods are available?
Thirdly, McConvill focuses on the importance of experiential purchases
as a key to happiness. He fails, however, to delineate a theory that describes
clearly what constitutes an experiential as opposed to a material purchase.
Whether a purchase is experiential or material “depends on the intention of

154. Id. at 1058.
155. Id. at 1040.
156. Patrick Haden, Introduction, in JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, i, xii (Dover
Publications, Inc. 2002).
157. See McConvill, supra note 16, at 1049.
158. Id. at 1056.
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the purchaser.”159 A purchase is experiential when the purchaser has the
primary intention of acquiring a life experience through her purchase.160 A
particular purchase could be defined as an experiential activity by one
person and as a material possession by another.161 There is no way of
knowing ex ante which purchases by which individuals will constitute an
experiential purchase because we have no way of discerning intention until
intention occurs. One’s intention may remain fluid and can change ex post.
A good acquired for one purpose can metamorphose into a good that
achieves another. The acquisition of shares of stock could be primarily a
material purchase animated by profits, but that does not rule out utilizing
the shares as an experiential purchase later.162
Finally, McConvill does not explain why people will choose to take
advantage of experiential/participatory goods if they are made available. He
constructs his case for greater participation by relying (at least partially) on
studies authored by Bruno Frey & Alois Stutzer,163 which insinuate that
people are dissatisfied with passive activities, and become happier as a
result of participation. However, an additional study authored by Frey,
Benesch & Stutzer suggests that when additional participatory activities are
made available, humans generally fail to take advantage of them.164 Why
should we expect human behavior to be any different when additional
experiential goods such as shareholder participation are made available
when there is little evidence that humans take advantage of existing
participatory activities? There are two far more persuasive alternative
conclusions. First, in keeping with the premise that people know their own
interests, participation in such activities simply yields less happiness than
McConvill claims. Or possibly, putatively passive activities such as
television-watching actually do contribute to participation and civic
engagement in the United States, and constitute a break from more directly
participatory activities.165

159.
160.
161.
162.
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164.

Id. at 1052.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1053.
McConvill, supra note 16, at 1047–48.
Bruno S. Frey, Christine Benesch & Alois Stutzer, Does Watching TV Make Us Happy? 4
(Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Univ. of Zurich, Working Paper No. 241, 2005), available
at http://www.iew.unizh.ch/wp/iewwp241.pdf. This study’s examination of passive activities by
Americans shows that during the period 1965 to 1995 the average leisure time of adults rose by
6.2 hours per week while TV viewing time rose by almost the same amount, 6.0 hours. During
that 40-year period, alternative participatory activities were doubtless available in
contradistinction to passive ones. Sufficiently motivated Americans could have taken advantage of
existing participatory opportunities. The evidence verifies that they have, thus far, failed to do so.
Id.
165. Pippa Norris, Does Television Erode Social Capital? A Reply to Putnam, 29 POL. SCI. &
POL. 474, 479 (1996).
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IV. CONCLUSION
McConvill’s shareholder participation framework relies on
psychonomics.166 Apparently, psychonomics heralds a certain kind of
expert, a superior one. This new mode of expert, like former varieties,
appears to be predisposed to disapprove of allowing the individual to make
unfettered choices in the marketplace.167 As Peart and Levy illustrate:
As long as the expert maintains that he possesses insight into the sorts of
preferences people “should” possess—if they only knew better—he must
also accept, and may perhaps even demand, responsibility for directing
those preferences until the subjects gain the sort of sophistication that he
enjoys.168

It is possible that the ability of shareholders, boards and firms to reason,
make judgments, and reach contractual agreements that empower directors
and not shareholders, is not to be trusted unless directed by experts.169 It is
equally possible, but seemingly unlikely, that classical economists erred by
believing that people make choices in response to incentives.170 If the
judgment of shareholders cannot be trusted, and if shareholders do not
respond adequately to incentives, then it is possible to posit the necessity of
transformative intervention by experts to ensure the achievement of a
certain level of human status and happiness.171 This argument, to the extent
and in the manner in which McConvill presents it, is unconvincing.
McConvill’s program commends participation leading to happiness, but
cannot avoid an empty circularity. He offers the following conclusion:
“Shareholder participation should be the end-game, recognising the direct
benefits to shareholders through treating their shares as an experiential
purchase.”172 If McConvill simply means that shareholders and firms should
adopt his preferences for participatory, relational and experiential happiness
as a possibility among a myriad others, it might be understandable. If, on
the other hand, he wishes to convert his preferences into a universal ideal, it
is less so, given the multiple problems with his theory’s outcome.
McConvill’s approach seems to be a set of preferences just like any other

We get, from American television, a diversity of channels, programs and choices. If
some choose [certain channels], they are likely to end up somewhat more interested in
the complex problems and issues facing American government at the end of the
twentieth century. . . . But compared with most democracies America is already high as
nation of joiners, with a dense network of civic associations.
Id.
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See id. at 19.
See id. at 20.
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set. As preferences, they could “be part of any welfarist approach, but their
weight and importance would be dramatically smaller than if they were
believed to be universal ideals.”173
Individuals and institutions that seize upon McConvill’s thesis as a
socially desirable approach to change the world will be disappointed. His
attempt at universalization collapses into welfarism, wherein the proper
locus of rational choice remains, as the price system implies, the selfinterested individual. Hirschman shows,
Two essential elements appear to characterize interest-propelled action:
self-centredness [sic], that is, predominant attention of the actor to the
consequences of any contemplated action for himself; and rational
calculation, that is, a systematic attempt at evaluating prospective costs,
benefits, satisfactions, and the like.174

In McConvill’s world, by contrast, selfish motives are employed for
two purposes: material gain and the opportunity to obtain relational goods
providing experiential and happiness benefits to investors. McConvill
constructs a system that mimics the price system but with a different metric
of utility: experiential welfare instead of material wealth. Even if
shareholders prefer participatory goods to material ones, McConvill fails to
specify why they must have an opportunity to purchase an increased array
of participatory goods as a constitutive component of corporate governance
when alternative, highly participatory frameworks are already available.
Investors who crave participatory experiences can choose from a rich stew
of alternative activities that are readily available in both the profit and nonprofit sectors. Investors who seek profits plus control can enjoy
partnerships, LLC’s and LLP’s, as well sole proprietorships.
Additionally, McConvill appears to ignore the costs of implementing
his program and the probable interest divergence among shareholders; these
things taken together undermine his proposal. Despite its short-comings,175
social science suggests that when humans act as citizens, “politicians,

173. GEORGAKOPOULOS, supra note 47, at 33.
174. Albert O. Hirschman, Interests, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: THE INVISIBLE HAND 156, 157
(John Eatwell, Murray Milgate & Peter Newman eds., 1989) (emphasis omitted).
175. For a comprehensive examination of the short-comings of social science, see SHANNON,
supra note 72. In sum, social science culminates the tradition of conspicuous criticism.
[I]t demands that one approach self and society with no assumptions or preconceptions;
that one accept no relation among people, or between people and their physical
environment, as ‘natural’; and that one engage in a rigorous process of inquiry that will
issue in some ‘new’ perspective on self and society. . . . [I]t is capable of producing an
infinite number of conflicting perspectives; that each perspective becomes obsolete
upon formulation, . . . and offers no way of adjudicating between these perspective
other than by engaging in a more rigorous version of the kind of inquiry that produces
the chaos of perspectives it seeks to order.
Id. at 189.
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managers, academics, professionals, . . . or factory workers, [they do so as]
resourceful, evaluative maximizers” who respond creatively to optimize the
opportunities the environment presents.176 It is doubtful that McConvill’s
analysis has extended this research to investors in particularly useful ways.
John Dewey saw “the epochal developments of evolutionary biology as
a model for immediate, constant, revolutionary social change,”177 creating a
new society comprised of new, non-conforming individuals.178 This new
society would be led by individuals who were enthralled by the new
possibilities associated with collaborative and participatory activities.
Professor Shannon shows that Dewey’s metaphor of cellular growth as an
alternative to stasis suggests not evolution so much as cancer.179 As
Shannon shows, this move in the hands of Dewey’s intellectual heirs led not
to order but to chaos.180 McConvill formulates a “new normality,” wherein
participation issues forth as a fresh effort to expand human frontiers,
enabling investors to continuously reinterpret relational experiences while
liberating their personal strengths and virtues from confining constraints
imposed by corporate hierarchs. In turn, this generates positive emotions for
shareholders181 and defies the status quo.182 Not unlike Dewey’s aspiration,
McConvill creates a new corporate governance model that offers the giveand-take of participation as an effort to deepen the significance and
satisfaction of human interaction. This evolutionary move, unconstrained
by fiduciary duties, has no defined stopping point, and it appears to
flounder. This is because social organisms populated by individuals and
groups (including investors and fellow contractors) work to maintain
existing structures or alternatively decide to exit the firm based on the
prudential and normative assessments of their own interests. McConvill’s
shareholder happiness initiative is ephemeral. Instead of augmenting
happiness, it is more likely to prove susceptible to infection in the form of
rent-seeking, additional costs, and less material wealth. In light of this
critique, the appropriate default rule for shareholder participation rights, as
a general matter, is not to have any beyond the limits that the director
primacy model prescribes. Properly understood, McConvill’s contention
that a strong case can be made for empowering shareholders as an end in
itself is Panglossian.

176. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, The Nature of Man, 7 J. APPLIED
CORP. FIN. 4, 19 (1994).
177. SHANNON, supra note 72, at 89–90.
178. See, e.g., id. at 65–91.
179. Id. at 90.
180. Id. at 189.
181. McConvill, supra note 16, at 1049.
182. Id. at 1053.

